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In an environment where shareholder rights cannot be enforced,
management might choose to honour these rights out of self interest.
This paper presents evidence from a sample of the 140 largest
Russian joint stock companies, of which only a minority of firms do
honour shareholder rights. These firms tend to have higher
valuations on the equity market. On the other hand, the introduction
of shareholder rights reduces the possibilities for management to
steal. This paper develops a simple model and gives some empirical
evidence on which firms are likely to choose to honour shareholder
rights. In particular, I find that larger firms are more likely to honour
shareholder rights, possibly because the expected value of stealing
profits is smaller as the likelihood of punishment in the case of
detection is higher. Furthermore, there is some evidence that large
outside blockholders, as well as the state in its role as shareholder,
are able to press for shareholder rights.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Russia privatised state-owned assets very quickly and allocated
considerable amounts of shares to insiders (workers and
management). The remaining shares were partly given away for free
to the population (voucher-privatisation), partly remained with the
state and partly sold to outside blockholders. While the Russian
privatisation procedure led to a very fast privatisation, it also
frequently resulted in dispersed ownership of shares. Since the
owners of small share packages have little incentive to collect costly
information to monitor management, many firms are essentially
controlled by management. This can be problematic, as an
unchecked management could be able to engage in asset stripping or
the diversion of profits for personal consumption. The creators of the
privatisation process were hoping that this problem would be
mitigated over time. As workers or the population sell their shares,
outside blockholders can come into existence or get stronger.
Furthermore, by selling state owned shares directly to outside
blockholders, the power of management would also be curbed.
Voucher funds were also meant to exercise a role in corporate
governance. For a very positive assessment of this privatisation
process see, for example, Boycko et al (1995). However, in practice
the role of outside blockholders has been restricted by the fact that
management can choose not to honour shareholder rights of outside
shareholders due to weak enforcement of the laws concerned. For
example, by mid 1996 only 17% of the largest 140 Russian firms
have complied with regulation that makes independent share-
registries obligatory. In the latest instance of a violation of
shareholder rights, 10% of the shares of Surgutneftegaz were issued
and sold below market prices to the Surgut Holding company, which
is controlled by insiders, in October 19961. Therefore it seems
2necessary to analyse the issue of shareholder rights to be able to
assess whether the optimism of Boycko et al is justified. La Porta et
al (1996) examined the relation between protection of investors and
the financing patterns observed over a cross-section of countries.
Their main findings suggest that concentrated ownership can act as a
substitute for strong legal protection of outside shareholders’
interests. However, their paper says little about how this equilibrium
outcome is reached. In this respect, the case of Russia is an
interesting natural experiment, where directly after the privatisation
process there were neither strong laws nor concentrated ownership.
Nevertheless, it can be observed that the insufficient protection of
outside shareholders is not a problem in every firm. It does seem to
be the case that some firms start to honour shareholder rights,
although it is only a minority among the 140 firms largest Russian
firms (by sales) whose shares are traded on the over-the-counter
market2. This paper examines what determines whether a firm does
honour shareholder rights. On the one hand it is shown that
shareholder-friendly behaviour is reflected in a higher valuation of
the firm in the equity market. On the other hand, the introduction of
shareholder rights is likely to reduce the possibilities for
management to steal. I find that an important determinant of good
behaviour towards shareholders is size. Larger firms are more likely
to honour shareholder rights (provide information to outsiders, use
independent shareholder registries etc.), possibly because the
expected value of stealing profits is smaller and the likelihood of
punishment in the case of detection is higher. Furthermore, there is
some evidence that the larger the stake of the outside shareholder,
the more likely a firm is to honour shareholder rights. This would
imply that some outsider shareholders push for shareholder rights.
Lastly, there is some evidence that a larger size of the stake of the
state is, ceteris paribus, associated with more shareholder-friendly
behaviour. This would suggest that pressure by the state in its role as
a shareholder also plays a role3. The only indicator of shareholder
rights which is not positively correlated with the size of the largest
outside investor or the stake of the state are dividend payments. They
are also the only measure of shareholder-friendly behaviour which is
3not positively correlated with all the other measures I use in this
paper. This points to the fact that dividends are not used to signal
that management is of a shareholder-friendly type and poses the
question why dividends are paid at all in Russia.
It is worth noting that these problems are not specific to Russia.
The 1995 International Finance Corporation (IFC) Factbook of
Emerging Markets lists only 5 out of the 26 emerging markets it
covers as having investor protection of an internationally acceptable
quality. It also singles out the Chinese equity market of having
especially poor investor protection. While this paper focuses on
Russia in its empirical investigation, which had not been included in
the last IFC ranking, the findings are relevant to other emerging
markets as well.
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes different
indicators as to what extent the largest 140 Russian joint stock
companies honour shareholder rights. Section 3 puts forward a
simple model to analyse which firms are likely to honour
shareholder rights. Section 4 describes the dataset used for the
empirical examination. Section 5 uses this data to test the hypothesis
of Section 3. Section 6 concludes.
2. SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS IN RUSSIA
In recent work Modigliani and Perotti (1996) have shown how the
development of the equity markets in different countries depends on
how well laws protect the property rights of minority shareholder.
Furthermore, La Porta et al have shown that the legal set-up matters
with respect to the ownership arrangement of joint stock companies.
In countries where legal institutions are underdeveloped and where
the enforcement of laws cannot be relied upon, it is not sufficient to
analyse the legal framework when examining whether shareholder
rights are honoured4. Instead, it is necessary to find indicators that
reflect the actual behaviour of management towards outside
shareholders. This is illustrated by a number of instances where
shareholder rights have been violated in Russia although legislation
4to remedy these problems had been in place, for example in the case
of Surgutneftegaz mentioned in the introduction. In this section,
several different indicators are proposed and data is presented for the
140 largest Russian open joint stock companies.
Shares give two different rights to its owners: rights of control
and income-rights5. During transition, the more important feature of
shares are arguably the control rights. This is true as the majority of
privatised enterprises are in need of severe restructuring. During this
period of restructuring, control rights matter even more than during
‘normal’ times because many long term, strategic decisions that can
involve substantial sunk costs have to be made. Furthermore, to the
extent that privatisation did not result in an allocation of control
rights that facilitates restructuring, this shortcoming is to be mitigated
in the secondary market. At the same time, income of firms is in
many cases relatively low during transition but is expected to grow
fast, such that income rights during the first years are of relatively
little importance. This is reflected in the discount at which
preference shares are traded (Table 1). Preference shares are shares
that have been issued for free to employees by the firms that chose
option 1 of privatisation (which roughly 25% did)6. These shares
amount up to 25% of the chartered capital. They have no voting
rights attached but are in general guaranteed preferential treatment
with respect to dividend payments. The details of this preferential
treatment vary across firms and are laid down in the corporate
charters. Most of these charters state that 10% of after tax profits, or
the equivalent to the dividend on ordinaries (whichever is greater),
have to be paid out as dividends to shareholders of preferred shares.
Table 1 shows the change of the premium of ordinary shares
over preference shares over time for some of the most liquid Russian
companies, where data is available. This discount decreased for most
of the firms substantially, for example in the case of LUKOil from
95% in October 1995 to 40% in September 1996. Of course,
preferred shares in October 1995 were very illiquid and not many
transactions have taken place at these prices. Since then liquidity has
increased markedly. However, apart from the increasing liquidity of
these shares the decrease in the premium is also likely to reflect the
5fact that the prime importance of control rights is slowly decreasing
in Russia as firms start to honour shareholder rights to a larger extent
and regulatory progress is made7. Still, the premium remains very
large, pointing to the importance for shareholders to participate
actively in shareholder meetings and the management of the
company in order to protect their investment. This interpretation is
also consistent with the finding that this discount is small in the US
(5%) and much larger in Israel (31%) and Italy (45%) — the latter
two countries with much weaker protection of investors8.
Table 1
Premia of Ordinary Shares Over Preference Shares
as Percentage of Ordinary Share Price
Date Rostelekom UES Lukoil Surgut-
neftegaz
Norilsk
Nickel
Noyabrsk-
neftegaz
2.10.95 95% 85% 88% 87% 62% 86%
10.1.96 93% 68% 83% 82% 57% 86%
1.4.96 68% 62% 70% 67% 29% 72%
3.7.96 56% 74% 65% 78% 62% 69%
26.9.96 41% 46% 40% 49% 50% 49%
Source: Prema-Invest
As income rights of equities are not codified in commercial law
(it is in the nature of the equity contract that dividend payments
cannot be enforced by a court), problems related to the difficulty of
enforcing shareholder rights in Russia are mostly related to the
control rights of shares. To examine to what extent managers honour
control rights of shares, this paper focuses on the independence of
shareholder registries, on the provision of information to
shareholders and on whether American Depository Receipts (ADRs)
or similar instruments were issued. ADRs are certificates sold at an
American securities exchange, denominated in USD, that are backed
by shares that are held in custody in Russia. An issue of these
instruments indicates that management does honour shareholder
6rights to the extent that the costs of violating them increases if ADRs
are outstanding. This does seem likely, as outstanding ADRs increase
the likelihood of detection of stealing. It also would increase the
likelihood of subsequent punishment, if one believes that the
international financial community has some clout with Russian
policy-makers.
Historically, the first issue of concern was the reliability of
share registries. In particular, several well publicised instances
occurred during 1994 and 1995, where management manipulated
share registries or refused to register new shareholders9. Since share
registries are the only proof of share-ownership in Russia, in effect
this amounted to negating property rights of outside investors.
Subsequently, several steps were taken to mitigate this problem: a
presidential decree was introduced in 1995 which makes
independent share-registries for firms with more than 1,000
employees obligatory. Based on this decree the FSC issued interim
regulations on the maintenance of share registers in July 1995.
These regulations determine how lawful entries in the share registries
are to be made and also introduces a liability of the registrar for any
improper performance of its duties. Furthermore, the need for share
registries to obtain a license from the FSC is stated. By 30 August
1996, licenses to 104 share registries in 49 regions have been
granted. Whether a firm uses a licensed share register is one of  the
indicators of shareholder rights this paper uses (‘License’). By
September 1996, 17% of the largest 140 Russian firms had their
shares registered by a licensed share registry. A second indicator that
relates to the same aspect of shareholder rights is based on a periodic
survey carried out by “Agenstvo Konsultii i Marketing” (AK&M). In
this survey, 308 participants in the Russian stock market (150
Moscow firms and 158 regional firms) were asked to name up to 5
companies for which they found it particularly easy to transfer the
ownership of stock (in order of convenience)10. The answers were
then used to calculate an index on the ease of ownership transfer
(‘Transfer’)11. This survey is likely to reflect similar issues as
‘License’. As is to be expected, the two measures are significantly
positively correlated (see Table 2). This seems to indicate that the
7licensing procedure of the FSC is effective in the sense that licensed
registries seem to involve lower risk of improper handling of entries
than unregistered ones.
Another important aspect of shareholder rights is the provision
of information on the company to shareholders. Information is
necessary to evaluate the performance of management and to use the
control rights of the shares in exercising corporate governance in a
meaningful way. The importance of this point is stressed by a
presidential decree of March 1996 which lays out a comprehensive
program on investors’ and shareholders’ rights and demands higher
disclosure requirements for firms12. The recent struggle between
outside investors, controlling 40% of the Novolipetsk Metallurgical
Kombinat, and management, who refuses to provide meaningful
financial statements to the investors, illustrates the problems
inherent in this area13. This paper focuses on two different variables
that measure this aspect. The first is a dummy variable that denotes
whether a firm has had its accounts done according to International
accounting standards (‘IAS’)14. This is important as Russian
accounting is still based on the necessities of the state economy and
consequently does not provide information that allows to evaluate
firms according to a market environment. By January 1996 24% of
the firms in the sample had (at least a partial) audit done according
to IAS. In September 1996, the government decided to grant tax
reductions for firms that would adopt these international accounting
principles15. As a second measure, the 308 participants in the
AK&M survey were also asked to name up to 5 firms that were
particularly open about disclosing information to investors (in order
of openness). The two measures are significantly positively
correlated (see Table 2).
The issue of an insufficient provision of information is also
relevant in other countries. The IFC Emerging Markets Handbook
lists only 8 out of the 26 markets it covers as having accounting
standards of an internationally acceptable quality. China and
Indonesia have especially poor accounting standards. In Jordan there
are not even interim financial disclosure requirements for the firms
implemented.
8Lastly, some firms issued ADRs, Global Depository Rights
(GDRs) or Russian Depository Receipts (RDCs). ADRs are mainly
of level 1, which can be traded on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) but are backed by shares the treasury of the firm hands over
to the depository. In this sense, they do only allow firms to raise new
capital in case the treasury owns some of the companies’ stock. This
is the case for many Russian firms as a result of the privatisation
process. The buyer of an ADR is allowed to exercise the voting right
of the underlying share. GDRs are essentially similar securities,
traded at different stock exchanges. RDCs are also very similar
certificates backed by Russian shares, held in custody by ING bank.
To the extent that these instruments allow foreigners more easily to
acquire Russian shares, this also indicates that management is
shareholder-friendly. Furthermore, the probability of being punished
for violating shareholder rights is likely to increase after ADRs have
been issued. This is true as violations become more visible since the
financial press will cover them more thoroughly. This, in turn, is
likely to increase the political pressure on management to undo the
violations16. By January 1996 10% of the sampled firms had issued
one of these instruments. Issuing these instruments is positively
correlated with the introduction of Western accounting. This is not
very surprising, as most of the firms who issued level 1 ADRs plan to
issue level 3 ADRs in the near future. For these type of ADRs 3
years of Western accounting is required by the NYSE17. Issuance of
ADRs are also positively correlated with the other measures of
shareholders’ (control) rights.
For the analysis of income rights it is necessary to examine the
dividend policy for ordinary shares of firms18. In 1993, 34% of firms
paid dividends on ordinary shares and close to 100% on preferred
shares. On ordinary shares dividends were quite small and at times
paid with substantial delays. In 1994 it was 42% of firms that paid
dividends on ordinary shares, announced in shareholder meetings
between March and May of 1995. Because there was no liquid
market for many of the shares in the sample, there are often no
meaningful share prices available. Therefore this paper uses a
9dummy variable on whether dividends were paid (‘Div’) instead of
dividend yields.
As first pointed out by Modigliani and Miller (1963), payments
of dividends would not matter in a perfect market setting. However,
in an environment of asymmetric information payment of substantial
dividends could indicate that management honours the right of
shareholders with respect to income generated by the firm. In
particular, as the majority of Russian firms face very large investment
needs and at the same time rarely generate sufficient funds to meet
them internally, dividend payments can serve two different functions:
First, it could be that dividends are paid to signal that management is
of the type that honours shareholder rights. After all, the costs of
paying dividends is higher for management that otherwise would
steal profits than for management that would otherwise reinvest
profits19. However, payment of dividends is the only indicator of
shareholder rights where the coefficient of correlation with the other
indicators is, in general, no different from zero at the 10%
significance level. This would imply that dividends do not act as a
very strong signal of shareholder-friendliness. Second, it could be
that management, which in general owns a substantial share package,
wants to get money out of the firm for the sake of personal
consumption without selling part of its share package. Indeed, it is
plausible for agents in transition economies to increase present
consumption relative to future consumption and it is also often the
case that management is highly reluctant to limit its control by
selling shares. While this seems more plausible, there is no direct
evidence for this proposition.
Table 2
Correlation of Indicators of Shareholder Rights
IAS ADR DISCLOSURE DIV LICENSE TRANSFER
IAS 1.000 0.345
(0.000)
0.326
(0.000)
-0.001
(0.986)
0.233
(0.005)
0.301
(0.000)
ADR 1.000 0.557
(0.000)
0.122
(0.150)
0.274
(0.001)
0.488
(0.000)
DISCLOSURE 1.000 0.139
(0.101)
0.314
(0.000)
0.883
(0.000)
10
DIV 1.000 0.047
(0.579)
0.065
(0.443)
LICENSE 1.000 0.350
(0.000)
TRANSFER 1.000
p-values in brackets
The positive and significant correlations between the indicators
that relate to control rights allow the construction of an index for
shareholder-friendliness. This is a sensible procedure because I want
as good a  measure for ‘shareholder-friendliness’ as possible. Since
all the listed indicators are associated with the underlying
‘shareholder-friendliness’, the index is a meaningful variable to
analyse. The index is constructed by normalising the two survey
measures to variables with mean 0 and standard deviation of 1. Then
all five measures (excluding the dividend dummy) are added up.
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3. WHICH FIRMS HONOUR SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS?
A SIMPLE MODEL
It has frequently been noted that during transition management is
often in control of the firms, even if this is not reflected in the
ownership structure. Therefore it is important to analyse the
incentives of management with respect to shareholder rights. The
following simple model does this under the basic assumption that
management has absolute control over the firm, irrespective of the
size of its own stake in firm ‘i’, denoted by ‘Si’. This allows
management to steal part of the profits with a present value of ‘bi’,
which is a random variable, if no shareholder rights are introduced.
The amount that can be stolen is a function of the size of the firm, as
measured by employment (‘e’). In general, larger firms are much
more tightly observed and more often regulated by government
institutions than small ones. The tax service, regulatory bodies,
ministries or former ministries are much more likely to scrutinise
large firms than small ones. This should make it harder for these
firms to steal on a large scale (in particular, if we analyse stealing per
head of the people that have the possibility to steal). Furthermore,
the punishment if caught stealing is likely to be higher for the large
firms because they are much more visible. It would therefore make
sense to punish them severely to deter other firms from stealing.
Therefore, the expected value of stealing should decrease with size.
On the other hand, it can be argued that larger firms are in a more
complex environment which increases the possibility to steal.
Therefore, the empirical investigation should help to find the correct
sign of the derivative of ‘b’ with respect to ‘e’. The value of the
existing assets if this stealing takes place is ‘ai’. Apart from the
possibility to steal, management also gets private benefits from
running the company, denoted by ‘ci(ei)’. They are a positive
function of the size of the firm, as measured by employment. Once
shareholder rights have been introduced, there is a chance that
management loses control and therefore these private benefits. The
likelihood of this happening is a random variable denoted by ‘p’,
which depends negatively on the stake owned by management and
12
positively on the stake the largest outside owner owns, ‘Li’. Once
shareholder rights are introduced, it is impossible to steal20.
Furthermore, the firm has a new project it wants to fund, whose
present value accruing to the old shareholder is a random variable
denoted by ‘ni’. It needs outside capital for this project. It is only
possible to obtain this external finance if shareholder rights are
introduced21. This implies that risk-neutral management chooses to
introduce shareholder rights, if
E [Si  ai + bi(ei) + ci | Oi] £  E [Si (ai + bi(ei)) + [1-p(Si,Li)] ci(ei) + Si ni | Oi],
 (1)
where ‘E’ denotes the expected value, conditional on the
information set of management of firm ‘I’, denoted by ‘Oi’. This
simplifies to
E [ bi(ei)| Oi] £ E[ (Si ni - p(Si,Li)ci ) / (1- Si) | Oi]
(2)
It is straightforward to see how management’s choice is
influenced by the different parameters. The partial derivative with
respect to ‘ni’ is positive: The larger the gains of the new investment,
the higher is the likelihood of shareholder-friendly behaviour22. With
respect to ‘bi’ the partial derivative is negative. The more that can be
stolen in a given firm, the more unlikely it is that management
introduces shareholder rights. The same is true with respect to ‘ci’.
The larger the private benefits of control, the less willing is
management to introduce shareholder rights. As regards
employment, the effect is not clear. As pointed out above, the
derivative of ‘bi’ with respect to ‘ei’ cannot be derived from
theoretical considerations. And ‘ci’ also depends on ‘ei’23. Lastly,
with respect to ownership, the likelihood of shareholder-friendly
behaviour in the above model increases with the share owned by
management and decreases with the share owned by the largest
outside shareholder. This is true for two reasons. First, the more
management owns, the smaller is the perceived threat to its control.
13
Therefore management gains less from trying to discourage active
participation of outside shareholders in shareholder meetings.
Second, the more management owns, the smaller are the incentives
to steal since it owns a larger part of the profits legally24. Of course,
this assumes that the different layers of management that own shares
collude and act like one shareholder would. If they instead compete
in stealing from the firm this effect is unlikely to be observed25. The
model relies on the assumption that management behaviour is
completely unchecked. In reality, the freedom of management is
likely to be restricted by two different sources.
First, outside private blockholders could potentially be able to
exert some influence on management. Even though privatisation very
often resulted in handing out large parts of the shares to insiders,
there are nevertheless quite a number of outside blockholders in
many Russian enterprises. These outsiders can be banks, investment
funds and brokerages, financial-industrial groups, non-financial firms
or foreign firms. If management has no sufficient incentives in the
above model to introduce shareholder rights, these outsiders could
either collude in stealing or press for shareholder rights. If they
collude, a bargaining game is played on how to split the rents from
stealing ‘bi’. The bargaining power depends on the relative stakes of
the two parties. If outsiders press for shareholder rights, they succeed
with probability ‘q’, which depends positively on ‘Li’ and negatively
on ‘Si’. Abstracting from the possibility of a change of management
(that is, of redistributing ‘c’) the fallback option for management in
case the bargaining breaks down is
E [ai Si + ci(ei)+(1-q) bi (ei)+ q Si (bi (ei)+ ni) | Oi]
(3)
The expected value of the fallback option of the outsider is
E [ai Li + q Li (bi (ei)+ ni) | Ooi],
(4)
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where ‘Ooi’ denotes the information set of the outsiders concerning
firm ‘i’. Assuming that management and outsiders have the same
information, the total amount the two parties can bargain over is
E [ai (Li+Si) + bi (ei)+ ci(ei) | Oi]
(5)
Collusion is the preferred strategy whenever there is a surplus over
the fallback strategy for the two parties. This is true as the Nash
bargaining mechanism makes both players with positive bargaining
power strictly better off than their fallback position. Therefore, the
two parties will not collude if
E [ bi(ei)| Oi] £ E [ (Li+Si) ni / (1- Li-Si) | Oi]
(6)
In this case, shareholder rights will be introduced with
probability ‘q’(Li, Si). Taking account of equation (2) which
describes when management has incentives to introduce shareholder
rights by itself, there are three regions with varying likelihood of
shareholder rights26:
O A B
 (Si ni )/(1-Si) (Li+Si)ni/(1-Li-Si) bi
prob=1 prob=q prob=0
For firms with values of ‘b’ between ‘0’ and ‘A’, management
introduces shareholder rights, just as in the case with 100%
management control. Between points ‘A’ and ‘B’, shareholder rights
are introduced with probability ‘q’ (Li, Si), that is if the outsider
succeeds in pushing for shareholder rights. For values of ‘bi’ above
point B, no shareholder rights are introduced as the outside
blockholder and management collude. In this variation of the set-up,
the comparative statics are essentially the same as above. The only
exception is the changes with respect to the share of the outside
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blockholder, ‘Li’. Now the larger the share of the outsider, the more
likely it is that shareholder rights are introduced. Between points ‘A’
and ‘B’ the likelihood rises as the outsider becomes stronger to push
for these rights. And at the same time point ‘B’ shifts to the right,
decreasing the area of collusion. This is true because as the benefit
from taking advantage of the small outside shareholders decreases,
the larger the combined share of management and the large
outsider27. This is the opposite of the case of 100% management
control and an empirical investigation is necessary to see which of
the two scenarios is more likely.
However, in general ownership might not be exogenous.
Although this paper represents very much an initial look at the
ownership structures as they emerged from the privatisation program,
it is still possible that the size of the largest outside stake might be
endogenous. In particular, concentration in outside ownership could
act as a substitute for poor legal protection, as argued by La Porta et
al (1996). If this was true, one would expect large shareholders to
invest in firms that do not honour shareholder rights (to
subsequently use their bargaining power to collude in stealing or to
push for shareholder rights). Smaller shareholders, because they
have little bargaining power, are more likely to pick firms where
management is committed to honour shareholder rights.
Furthermore, in the above model it is only the large shareholders,
who have an incentive to increase their stake ‘L’, who are in a
situation where no shareholder rights are honoured and where no
collusion takes place. This is true as the value of their existing shares
increases with ‘q’, which is a positive function of ‘L’. Under this
scenario the size of the small outside blockholding should be
associated with relatively high levels of shareholders protection, just
as in the case of fully management controlled firms28.
Apart from outside blockholders, the state could play a role in
controlling management. It is an important feature of large Russian
enterprises that the state still holds substantial stakes in many of
them, even after they have been ‘privatised’. A World Bank survey
carried out in the summer of 1994 found that only in 35% of
‘privatised’ Russian firms the state held no shares (Pistor and
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Turkewitz, 1996). In 17% of firms the state ownership was between
0% and 10%, and in 19% of firms between 10% and 20%. In the
context of this paper state holdings also include holdings by regions
or state organisations. It has been asserted that the state does not in
general use the ownership rights that are attached to the firm or is
implicitly colluding with management (Frydman et al, 1996).
However, this seems to be the case mainly in respect to participation
in strategic decisions, where the last decades have taught the state
that it has no comparative advantage in making these decisions. It is
more likely that the state does use its voting rights to press for the
implementation of shareholder rights. This can be expected because
the state is planning to sell-off its remaining stakes in the near future
and is therefore interested in higher share prices. This commitment
makes it different to the type of private outside blockholder who
invests into the company for the long run. Apart from these private
incentives as an owner, the state also has an interest to promote
better corporate governance to increase the likelihood of successful
restructuring. For this to happen a mechanism to reallocate
controlling rights over enterprises is necessary, one of which can be
the share market. This possibility increases incentives for the state to
push for shareholder-friendly behaviour. As a matter of fact, the
activity of the FSC and the introduction of the laws cited above give
some credibility to the hypothesis that the state recognises its interest
in promoting shareholder rights. More specifically, the government
passed a resolution in February 1995 under which it will not provide
any help to companies which violate shareholder rights. While it is
clear that enforcement of this legislation is difficult through ‘normal’
channels of the legal system, it seems possible that the directors on
the board that represent the state are better positioned to influence
management’s decisions in this respect. On the other hand, if the
state has different objectives such as avoiding unemployment, it is
unlikely that it would push for shareholder rights29. This is true as
outside shareholders are more likely to restructure the enterprises
actively.
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4. THE DATA
As opposed to the enterprise surveys carried out by the World Bank
and by Blasi and Shleifer, this paper analyses data on enterprises
collected by brokerages and financial information services and not
information that is directly collected from the firms. Therefore there
are only firms in the sample that are organised as open joint stock
companies. Furthermore, the data set only comprises information on
the largest Russian firms (by sales), as the interest of investors is
naturally highest in these firms. This makes this study
complementary to the ones mentioned above, which focus mainly on
small and medium sized firms. Furthermore, the focus on large firms
should give the study some macroeconomic relevance, as the firms in
the sample represent a significant amount of the total industrial
workforce (27%). Given that data is collected in a transition
economy, there is an issue of the quality of the data. In particular, it
is an open question as to what extent managers reveal information
truthfully. It seems likely that differences in the quality of data
between direct sampling and using information of brokerages are
slight, as these institutions obtain their information by visiting the
enterprise and interviewing management as well. Since brokerages
are likely to have other sources of information on these firms as well,
it could be the case that they find it easier to cross-check the data
and improve its reliability. For example, information on the
ownership structure of a firm can be cross-checked by observing its
general shareholders meeting, which brokerages do to some extent.
Furthermore, these brokerages have access to the products of
financial information providers such as Skatepress and Dun and
Bradstreet, who also interview companies and their management.
Nevertheless, it is possible that some outside blockholdings are
omitted in my data. This problem should be more important for
relatively smallish stakes, as these shareholdings are not necessarily
disclosed during the general meeting. Therefore, in the regression
analysis I focus on the stake of the largest outside blockholder,
where I believe that omissions should be negligible. The sample of
this paper was constructed by merging data from different sources
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into one dataset. I have obtained data from Brunswick Brokerage,
Renaissance Capital and Troika Dialog. Therefore, it is possible that
different series have different numbers of observations.
The sample contains 140 firms which overall employ 3.9
million employees. The mean employment is 25,300. The firms are
concentrated in the following industries: communications,
electricity, metallurgy, transport and oil and gaz. For a detailed
breakdown by industry see Appendix B. The majority of firms are
registered in Moscow, but almost every region is represented in the
sample. Given that a firm whose production facilities are all in
Siberia could choose to have its headquarters registered in Moscow,
the predominance of Moscow firms does not imply that there is a
regional bias in the sample30.
Ownership data is given as of the end of January 1996. The
average number of outside blockholder is 1.7, the median is 1.0.
Blockholders are defined as institutions or individuals that hold
more than 5% of the shares. These blockholders hold together on
average 29.7% of the shares, with a median of 27.6. The largest of
the blockholders holds on average 23.0%, the median being 20%. In
17% of firms, no outside blockholder is reported. These values are
similar to the ones found by the Blasi and Shleifer survey (BSS) of
medium sized firms (see Table 3). They report for the end of 1995 an
average stake of outsiders of 31.2%. However, the composition of
outside blockholders is very different in the two samples. The
following numbers report the average of the largest owner of a given
type in a given firm31: The outside owner with the largest average
stake were holding-companies and officially registered financial-
industrial groups (FIGs) with an average of 11.4%. The second
largest outside stake is held by non-financial firms, 6.7% on average.
Investment funds (including brokerages) have the same average stake
as banks: 3.5%. Lastly, foreign financial firm has an average stake of
2.1%32. The distribution is highly uneven, though. The median for
all these ownership classes is 0%, that is, in more than 50% of firms
the given institution does not own any shares. The ownership
structure by industry is given in Appendix C. Compared to BSS,
where holding companies or FIGs own on average 4.9%, this sample
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has a much higher average ownership by this type of firm and a much
lower ownership of Russian commercial firms.
Apart from outside owners there are also pronounced
differences in the stake the state still holds in these firms. In my
sample, the average stake is 13%, as opposed to 9% in BSS. In both
cases the median is 0, pointing once more to the concentration of the
stakes. These numbers also could imply that the state is more
actively involved in the management of the larger firms.
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Table 3
Ownership of Russian Firms
This sample BSS
Sample size 140 185
Date Jan-96 Q4-95
Mean Employment 25,300 2,444
Mean number of outside blockholder (>5%) 1.7 NA
Mean holding of outside blockholders 29.7 31.0
Mean holding of largest blockholder 23.0 NA
of which
Holding or FIG 11.4 2.6
Non-financial firms 6.7 14.6
Investment funds 3.5 4.9
Banks 3.5 2.0
Foreign financial firm 2.1 0.0
State 13.0 9.0
Some of the variables in the simple model above are not
directly observable. But some plausible proxies exist. As a proxy for
benefits from raising capital, ni,  industry dummies are introduced. In
particular, a dummy for the communications industry (‘Comm’), for
the electricity industry (‘Electricity’), for the oil and gaz industry
(‘Oil and Gaz’), for the metal industry (‘Metal’) and for
transportation (‘Transport’) is used. A list of all variables used in
this paper is attached as Appendix A. Another proxy for investment
needs is the percentage of fixed assets in a firms balance sheet. While
it is clear that this number, which is taken from the firms Russian
financial accounts, cannot be compared to the Western equivalent, it
is still possible that there is some information in the cross-section
across Russian firms. Assuming that the physical assets of all firms
have to be replaced to a similar extent, the percentage of fixed assets
in the balance sheet can proxy for this investment (Table 4).
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Table 4
Average Percentage of Fixed Assets in Balance Sheet
Comm 77.08
(10.48)
Transport 67.83
(20.56)
Electricity 57.85
(15.81)
Oil and Gaz 56.99
(20.15)
Metal 47.41
(15.26)
Standard deviation in brackets
These correlations would indicate that investment needs are
particularly high in the communications industry, high in the
transportation industry and rather low in the metals industry33. The
actual value for the fixed assets is not used in the regressions as it is
available for only 100 firms and as they are presumably very noisy34.
With respect to the decision to pay dividends, the profits of the
firm are also clearly relevant. In 1994 dividends were declared by
43% of firms in the sample, but usually dividends were rather small.
The regression that tries to explain them uses the return (Russian
gross profits) over sales (‘ROS’), as well for the year 1994. ROS is
available for 98 firms. Again, this measure is used in the hope that
there is some information in the cross-section over Russian firms,
even if that number cannot be compared to its Western equivalent.
The average return on sales for 1994 was 18%. As data on the
accounts for 1995 was available for far fewer companies, the data for
1994 was used. Furthermore, using the year 1994 also gets rid of the
problem that in 1995 some firms had already been using IAS, which
could bias this measure.
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5.  TESTING THE HYPOTHESES
In a first step it is necessary to check the assumption that better
behaviour towards shareholders is likely to be reflected in a higher
valuation of the firm (which should increase by bi). Analysing first
the p/e ratio, there should be some effect regardless of the timing of
the introduction of shareholder rights35. And, indeed, ‘Index’ has a
positive coefficient which is significant with a p-value of 0.08736.
This demonstrates that the shareholder-friendliness of management
does affect the valuation of the firms37. If the index constructed
above rises by 1 unit, the P/E-ratio rises on average by 2.7. ‘e’ and
‘Div’ were dropped in this regression, as they had no significance.
The industry-dummy ‘Transport’ is significant at the 10% level. This
would indicate that the market expects profits to grow most quickly
in the transportation industry. In the electricity industry the opposite
seems to be the case. The overall regression has an adjusted R
squared of 0.32 and is significant at the 1% level38.
Secondly, the return of the shares during 1995 (capital gain
adjusted for dividend payments and share-splits) is regressed on
indicators of shareholders rights as well as on industry dummies and
size. Dummies have been introduced to capture differences in the
competitive environment across industries. Size was put into the
regression to control for potentially differing restructuring needs
according to firm size. The coefficient of the index of shareholder
rights has the opposite sign that was expected, but is not significant.
This is not too surprising, as one would only expect these firms to
outperform the market if the changes had unexpectedly been
introduced during 1995. Whenever these changes happened or had
been expected before 1995, it is clear that no reaction can be
observed. Industry dummies are also insignificant. This is interesting
as it indicates that the industry dummies do not capture differences
in the competitive environment across industries very well. It seems
much more to depend on the firm level than on the industry level
whether a firm is successful as measured by the share price
performance. Furthermore, the insignificance of size implies that
restructuring needs do not systematically differ by firm size. Whether
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a dividend is paid affects the return significantly at the 1% level. This
is consistent with the observation that share prices do not always fall
in line with the dividend payment on the ex-dividend day39.
However, the explanation for this phenomenon is partly that pledged
dividends are frequently paid with substantial delays and the ex-
dividend date is not always known. This would tend to overstate the
return of firms that pay dividends (since the calculation assumes that
dividends are actually paid fully and immediately). Furthermore, as
will be more formally shown below, dividend payments are, ceteris
paribus, more likely the larger the firms’ (Russian accounting)
profits. Even though these profits can not be compared to their
Western equivalent, they seem to be reflected in the share price
performance. If the profits are put into the regression, ‘Div’ becomes
insignificant. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that the payments of
dividends act as a signal to shareholders that management is of a
shareholder-friendly type, at least not a signal that conveys more
information than the profit figure. The regression is nevertheless
significant at the 1% level and its adjusted R2 is 0.17.
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Table 5
Return and P/E Regressions
OLS with robust
standard errors
OLS with robust
standard errors
OLS with robust
standard errors
Dependent variables P/E Return Return
C 0.587
(0.306)
16.784
(0.558)
49.616
(1.133)
Index 2.577*
(1.743)
-7.784
(-1.528)
-7.489
(-1.194)
Div - 104.244***   (3.843) 43.775
(1.273)
ROS - - 0.775
(0.580)
Comm -3.401
(-1.106)
-37.995
(-1.220)
-101.619*
(-1.839)
Electricity -9.048*
(-1.637)
-36.728
(-0.692)
-38.698
(-0.657)
Metal 1.295
(0.622)
-58.293
(-1.320)
-86.961
(-1.625)
Oil and Gaz 4.982
(1.081)
-53.333
(-1.538)
-97.204**
(-2.267)
Transport 127.026*
(1.741)
-38.364
(-0.983)
-49.004
(-0.842)
e - 0.001
(0.846)
0.001
(1.040)
e^2 - -2.32E-09
(-1.341)
-2.99E-09
(-1.298)
N 66 66 47
R-squared 0.3872 0.2877 0.2824
adj. R-squared 0.3227 0.1733 0.0831
F-statistic 3.41 3.55 2.82
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0041 0.0015 0.0109
t values are given in brackets. ‘*’ denotes significance at the 10% level,
‘**’ at the 5% level and ‘***’ at the 1% level.
Given that shareholder-friendliness is reflected in the valuation
of a firm, is it also the case that firms who honour shareholder rights
make use of this fact to fund their investment needs? Table 6 shows
that the correlation of the number of share-issues a firm has
undertaken and the indicators of behaviour towards shareholder are
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all positively correlated. This implies that management indeed treats
shareholders well in order to raise new capital. However, it has to be
borne in mind that in many of these share-issues no new capital has
been raised. In general, most of the new shares were just allocated to
the old shareholders when the capital of a firm was revalued. In this
case, the firm does not receive any new capital. However, since these
revaluations are likely to have happened the same amount of times
for all the firms, a higher than average number of issues is likely to
reflect genuine share issues that did raise new capital. This effect is
picked up by the correlations40.
Table 6
Correlation Between Share Issues and Shareholder Rights
License 0.202
 (0.019)
Transfer 0.141
( 0.105)
IAS 0.177
( 0.040)
Disclose 0.277
(0.001)
ADR 0.294
(0.001)
Dividend 0.269
(0.002)
p-values in brackets
Having thus tested one of the assumptions of the above model,
regressions are run to explain which firms are more shareholder-
friendly. Concerning ‘Index’, OLS regressions were run and for ‘Div’
probit regressions. First, only variables that were definitely
exogenous to the problem were used: employment (‘e’), industry
dummies and share of the state (‘State’). In a second step the size of
the ownership of the largest outsider (‘Largest’) was added. These
regressions have to be interpreted with care as it is not entirely clear
whether ‘Largest’ is truly exogenous. However, there is no obvious
instrument available and it turns out that the sign of the coefficient is
the opposite of what one would expect under the hypothesis of
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endogeneity. As White tests indicated that the hypothesis of non-
heteroskedasticity had to be rejected at the 5% level for these
regressions, the OLS as well as the probit regressions were run with
robust variance-covariance matrix.
The ‘Index’ -regression has an adjusted R2 of 0.28 and is
significant at the 1% level. Employment ‘e’ is positive and significant
at the 1% level and its square is negative and significant. The point
estimates imply that for firms with employment of less than roughly
534,000, shareholder-friendliness increases with employment, but at
a decreasing rate. As the largest firm in the sample has 360,000
employees, this is true for all firms in the sample. Formally, I cannot
distinguish whether this is due to fixed costs of entering the capital
market or due to the higher ease of stealing in small firms. However,
I find the latter argument more plausible, as even the smaller firms in
my sample are likely to have investment needs that are large enough
to make the fixed costs of equity issues negligible. Then the
derivative of bi with respect to ei would be positive. There is no
evidence that stealing in larger firms is facilitated due to the more
complex environment. Furthermore, if private benefits to
management of running the firm, ci, are positively correlated with ‘e’
they are empirically not the most relevant aspect.
The variable ‘State’ has a positive coefficient, which is
significant at the 10% level. The hypothesis that the state hinders the
introduction of shareholder rights because it wants to avoid
restructuring for exogenous reasons is clearly not borne out by the
data. The findings can be interpreted as evidence for the hypothesis
that the state does use its voting rights to cause management to
honour shareholder rights41.  This is also consistent with survey data
for the Ukraine, reported by Daniel Kauffmann (1996). There it is
shown that state enterprises under-report less of their sales than
privatised or new private firms. This is presumably true as the state in
its role as shareholder observes the firm more tightly and might press
for truthful recording42. An alternative hypothesis would be that
management feels less threatened by outside blockholders who
might aim for control of the firm the more shares the state holds.
After all, the larger the state-ownership, the smaller the likelihood of
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a hostile take-over. However, given that management is likely to
anticipate the sell-off of the state’s stakes, this line of reasoning
would also imply that management believes that the privatisation
process is likely to be discontinued or will result in even more inside
ownership. This does not seem very plausible43.
Adding the variable ‘Largest’ and its squared values to the
regression leaves all coefficients with the same sign as previously.
With respect to ‘Largest’ the underlying specification seems to be
quadratic. For small outsider stakes, the coefficient is positive (and
significant at the 10% level), but the coefficient of the squared
‘Largest’ is negative and significant at the 5% level. The estimated
coefficients imply that for outside stakes larger than 42%,
shareholder-friendliness starts to decrease. As ‘Largest’ is in general
smaller than 42%, the basic effect of this variable is positive, if at a
decreasing rate44. This would lend some credibility to the hypothesis
that the outside shareholders bargain with management. As their
bargaining power increases, they tend to be more successful in
pushing for shareholder rights. They are also less likely to collude
with management, as they can benefit less from stealing. The data
does not suggest that management has unlimited control in the
absence of shareholder rights, as for this case the above model
would imply a negative sign for ‘Largest’. The positive coefficient
would also make it harder to argue that ‘Largest’ is endogenous.
Of the industry dummies, only ‘Metal’ is significant (at the 5%
level) and has a negative coefficient. The communications industry
has the largest (and positive) coefficient of all industries, but it is
insignificant at the 10% level. If ‘Largest’ is included, the Electricity
industry also becomes significant and positive. This is roughly in line
with investment needs, as proxied by the ratio of fixed assets in the
balance sheet. According to this measure, it is the communications
industry with the largest, and the metals industry with the lowest,
investment needs. Therefore there is some weak evidence that the
industry dummies can act as a proxy for returns from future
investment, ni. This is in line with the observation that the
communications industry has presumably the highest increase in
demand for its services of all the industries for which a dummy has
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been introduced. It is noteworthy that the investment needs we talk
about are the needs that would potentially be fulfilled by share-
issues. In the case of oil-firms, for example, it could be the case that
new projects are mainly implemented by joint ventures with foreign
firms, who would raise a large part of the required finance.
Table 7
Index-Regressions
Dependent Variable
is Index
OLS with robust standard errors OLS with robust standard errors
C -0.608
(-1.630)
-0.799*
(-1.735)
State 0.026*
(1.688)
0.022
(1.594)
Comm 1.785
(1.138)
1.903
(1.182)
Electricity 1.162
(1.541)
1.725**
(2.065)
Metal -0.659**
(-2.299)
-0.561*
(-1.899)
Oil and Gaz -0.241
(-0.475)
-0.012
(-0.024)
Transport -0.301
(-0.667)
-0.246
(-0.572)
e 4.29E-05***
(3.103)
4.39E-05***
(3.226)
e^2 -8.03E-11**
(-2.092)
-8.27E-11**
(-2.166)
Largest - 0.038*
(1.790)
Largest^2 - -0.001**
(-2.342)
N 140 140
R squared 0.3237 0.3427
adjusted R squared 0.2824 0.2917
F-statistic 2.87 2.41
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0057 0.0117
T-statistics are given in brackets. ‘*’ denotes significance at the 10% level,
 ‘**’ at the 5% level and ‘***’ at the 1% level.
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Lastly, the decision to announce dividends on ordinary shares
for the year of 1994 is analysed (Table 8). In these regressions the
additional variable ‘ROS’, the return over sales in the year 1994, is
introduced. As could be expected, its coefficient is positive and
significant at the 1% level. Even though the Russian accounting data
seems ill-suited to compare the firms to Western equivalents, there
seems to be some information in this data that is helpful to analyse
dividend decisions of Russian managers. ‘e’ is, once more, significant
at the 1% level and positive. If the expected value of stealing is
lower in large firms, manager might be more willing to pay out
dividends.
The state does not press for dividend payments. It seems mainly
concerned to put the firm in a position where the control rights of
shareholders can be guaranteed45. For ‘Largest’, the coefficients have
the opposite sign of the ones which explain ‘Index’, one of them is
significant at the 10% level. This also implies that the incentives for
the largest outside blockholders with respect to dividends are
different from the ones with respect to control rights. Dividend
payments are also not directly in line with investment needs. While
the electricity firms all announced dividends, firms in the
communications industry were less likely to declare dividends on
ordinary shares. These findings seem to suggest that dividend
payments are not used to signal to investors that management
honours shareholder rights. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that the dummy for dividend payments is not positively correlated
with other measures of shareholder rights. Lastly, in the return
regressions dividends are not significant if it is controlled for profits.
One hypothesis concerning dividend payments would be the
following: If management can determine the ex-dividend date ex-post
they could use this decision to channel funds to certain shareholders
that are close to management. Therefore paying dividends could not
be used to signal that management is of a shareholder-friendly type
and large shareholders would then not push for these payments.
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Table 8
DIV Regressions
Dependent
Variable is DIV
PROBIT with robust standard
errors
PROBIT with robust standard
errors
C -1.563**
(-3.113)
-1.570**
(-2.210)
ROS 0.053***
(3.633)
0.056***
(3.457)
State -0.011
(-0.977)
-0.008
(-0.651)
Comm -0.676
(-1.015)
-0.871
(-1.223)
Electricity + + + + + +
Metal -0.033
(-0.083)
-0.161
(-0.384)
Oil and Gaz 0.272
(0.509)
-0.016
(-0.028)
Transport 1.918***
(2.644)
2.034***
(2.639)
e 1.51E-05***   (2.584) 1.89E-05***
(2.721)
Largest - -0.037
(-1.069)
Largest^2 - 0.001*   (1.686)
N 86 86
Log likelihood -43.505741 -41.426515
Likelihood  ratio 0.2462 0.2822
chi2 25.96 28.82
Prob(chi2) 0.0011 0.0013
T-statistics are given in brackets. ‘*’ denotes significance at the 10% level,
‘**’ at the 5% level and ‘***’ at the 1% level.
+ + +: The observations of the electricity sector were dropped since all the 11
firms declared dividends. Whether a firm is in the electricity sector is therefore a
perfect predictor of whether dividends are declared.
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6. SOME CONCLUSIONS
To the extent privatisation resulted in strong de facto insider control,
which is not necessarily reflected in formal ownership, management
has incentives different from those of formal owners. While in
principle the resulting problems can be mitigated by introducing
laws on shareholder (and creditor) rights, law enforcement is often
difficult during the development of the capital markets. This
management behaviour can be explained by the fact that the main
objective of management is to keep control of the firm and to
consolidate their de facto control. This is likely to lead to inefficient
decisions concerning the restructuring of the firm, in particular, if
restructuring requires outside (human and physical) capital.
However, the problems can be mitigated in two different ways.
First, self interest might cause management to start to honour
shareholder rights. If the potential returns to investment that accrue
to management in its role as shareholder outweigh the utility-loss of
reduced control over the firm, management might be more willing to
honour shareholder rights. The significance of employment, which I
take as a proxy for the expected value of stealing, would tend to
support this hypothesis. Furthermore, weak evidence that investment
needs as proxied by industry dummies matter also gives some
evidence that this effect plays a role.
Second, outside pressures might be strong enough to force
management to introduce shareholder rights. The paper presents
some evidence that the largest outside investor has some bargaining
power as well that can be used to introduce shareholder rights. This
effect becomes weaker for very large shareholders, though.
Furthermore, there is some evidence that the state might be able to
use its remaining shares in the firms to put pressure on management
to introduce shareholder rights. Even if the state is passive in the
management of the company, it has a strong incentive to increase the
valuation of the firms since it is committed to sell its shares off in the
foreseeable future. More broadly speaking this implies that in the
context of weak law enforcement, limited state involvement in the
firms could keep management in check.
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 ENDNOTES
1. While the share issue had been authorised by shareholders at
the annual shareholders meeting, the price at which the sale took
place might constitute a violation of the law on joint stock
companies. This law lays out that new issues have to be sold at or
above market prices. The Federal Securities Commission (FSC), the
regulatory body for the Russian capital markets with ministerial
rank, is at present examining this case.
2. These shares are not necessarily very liquid. Only for about 50
firms is there reliable share price information available. Shares in the
other 80 firms are highly illiquid and only very few trades occur.
3. My data does not distinguish between shares held by regional
administrations and by the federal one.
4. Even if the letter of the law is honoured, inexperienced courts
combined with ambiguous legislation might lead to the possibility of
more subtle violations of the spirit of the laws.
5. For one of the earliest manifestations of this idea see, for
example, Grossman and Hart (1980).
6. The privatisation process in Russia allowed for three different
options to privatise a firm which differ by how much (and what type)
of the shares are allocated to insiders.
7. The discount has also been related to a risk that preference
shares are going to be swapped into ordinaries at unfavourable rates.
However, holder of preference shares have the right to vote on these
issues. As a swap would necessitate a change in the corporate charter
which requires a 75% majority, this risk is rather small given that
preference shares amount to 25% of charter capital. This risk is
therefore mainly relevant, if one believes that management is in
effect not bound by the corporate charter.
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8. See, for example, Levy (1982) or Zingales (1995).
9. For example, in 1994 the director of the Krasnoyarsk
Aluminium Factory cancelled out a 20% shareholding of a British
metal firm. However, this shareholding was subsequently reinstated
due to political pressure on management.
10. Since another question in the survey related more directly to
the liquidity of the share, this question is likely to pick up mainly
legal aspects and differences in transaction costs of re-registering
shares. These, in turn, can be directly controlled by management.
11. Each firm received points depending on their rank (ranging
from 30 to 10, in steps of 5) implying that the final rating would be
between 0 and 9,240. In response to this question, 222 companies
were mentioned.
12. In addition, the law on the securities market, which came into
effect in April 1996, details disclosure requirements for the case of
the issue of new securities.
13. See Financial Times, 21 February 1997.
14. To be precise the variable measures whether accounts have
been done by a Western accounting firms. While it does at times
happen that these firms are asked to produce Russian style accounts,
this seems to be quite rare. Furthermore, even if this is the case it
still signals that management is comparatively shareholder-friendly,
as accounts checked by a Western accounting firm with a reputation
to lose is likely to be more reliable than the one provided by a
Russian firm.
15. See Moscow Times, 18 September 1996. As this policy has just
been announced it is unlikely to have affected the choice of
accounting rules in the sample.
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16. In an interview in the Moscow Times (16 November 1996),
management of Surgutneftegaz stated that ‘competent analysts
should have guessed that we were going to do this (the dilution)
before the ADR issue (which is planned for later this year) because
later it would be more difficult and more trouble’.
17. Level 2 ADRs are listed at an exchange, whereas level 1 ADRs
are traded over the counter. Level 2 ADRs also allow to raise new
capital for the firm only to the extent that the firm’s treasury holds
the underlying shares.
18. In this context it is important to focus on dividends paid on
ordinary shares and not on preference shares. This is true as during
the privatisation process preference shares were only issued to
employees, not to any outsiders. Subsequent trading in these shares
was very limited as workers were obliged to keep these shares for
three years after privatisation. Therefore dividends on preference
shares mainly reflect payments to insiders and do not indicate good
behaviour with respect to outside shareholders.
19. Formally, a dividend signalling model along the lines of Ross
(1977) or Bhattarchaya (1979) could be constructed to fit this case.
20. In this context the introduction of shareholder rights is assumed
to be irreversible as a reversal would require a 75% majority in a
general shareholder meeting.
21. In the context of the examination of shareholder rights, it
would be natural to interpret the outside finance as raised by equity
issues. However, bond issues are possible as well. To some extent
the argument above can be applied to them as well. After all, firms
that do not steal presumably find it easier to raise finance by bonds
as well. In any case, there are at present no markets for corporate
debt, but there is a reasonably liquid one for equities. This would
facilitate equity issues as compared to debt issues. Apart from
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tradable debt, there is the possibility to obtain loans. However, up to
the present time there have not been many significant long-term
loans, presumably partly due to the inflationary environment which
would tend to favour equity as the cheaper indexation mechanism.
22. Akamatsu (1995) reports an example of this mechanism at
work. Alfa Capital, who had bought 25% of Bolshevik Biscuit
Company in December 1992, was not permitted in the shareholders’
meeting. Subsequently Alfa Capital applied to a court, but without
success. Finally, management allowed Alfa Capital into the meeting
after it had promised to raise money to modernise the Bolshevik
plant.
23. Another argument which would result in the same sign for ‘E’
are fixed costs to access capital markets. These fixed costs could
deter smaller firms from aiming to tap these markets, which would
reduce their incentives to implement shareholder-friendly policies.
However, the fact that the sample only includes firms that are
relatively large makes this argument rather unconvincing.
24. In a sample of Klepach et al (1996) the firms controlled by
management are more likely to implement an ‘active survival’
strategy than employee-, state- or outsider-controlled firms. To the
extent that this strategy comprises management trying to raise new
funds, this finding supports the notion that the more management
owns, the more  likely is it that shareholder rights are introduced.
25. The very simple model above is static and cannot explain why
a firm would switch from shareholder-unfriendly to shareholder-
friendly behaviour. The principal mechanism I would like to suggest
is that management buys up shares and an increase in Si would then
lead to a switch in behaviour. However, as I have no data on
ownership over time, this will be left for subsequent research.
26. Again, this abstracts from threats to changes in private rents c.
Furthermore, liquidity considerations are disregarded in this set-up.
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27. This is a similar prediction as the one made by Shleifer and
Vishny (1986) who argue that cumulating shares reduces the free
rider problem of monitoring management and therefore can make
management more likely to maximise shareholders’ wealth.
28. If shareholder-unfriendly management could prevent
shareholders from increasing their stakes, this could lead to the
opposite bias. However, in reality it seems to be the case that
management can, in general, not prevent share transactions among
outsiders, but instead might choose not to disclose information etc.
29. See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). The authors
show that public enterprises can be encouraged by politicians
subject to pressure from interest groups, such as labour unions, to
employ too many people.
30. To some extent it can even be argued that it is a sign of
shareholder-friendly behaviour to register a firm in Moscow, as it
may facilitate the attendance of shareholders at the general meeting.
Therefore it is not advisable to control for the region the firm is
registered in when running the regressions that are supposed to
explain whether shareholder rights are honoured.
31. This means that if two investment funds have a block in a given
company, the average includes only the block held by the larger of
the two.
32. It should be noted that January 1996 was a point where foreign
involvement in the Russian equity market was at its lowest point this
year. Therefore one would expect much higher values for foreign
ownership in late 1996.
33. It is indeed plausible that the investment needs in the
communications industry are particularly high as demand for
communications services multiplied with the change of the economic
system in Russia. It is also worth noting that the first (and to date
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only) Russian firm to issue a level 3 ADR was the telecom provider
Vimplecom.
34. Including the variable into the subsequent regressions does not
improve the fit.
35. Of course, if markets would expect that the other firms were
about to honour shareholder rights this would be reflected in the
market valuation and the variables in the regression should be
insignificant.
36. Nash and Willer (1995) use a different measure for the
valuation of some firms in the oil-industry and find that the variable
‘Transfer’ did help to explain differences in valuation.
37. It could also be argued that high p/e-ratios are the reason for
honouring shareholder rights. If high p/e ratios proxied for high
investment needs, this could be possible. While this would make it
impossible to talk about causation in the above regression, it would
be entirely consistent with the above model.
38. Depending on the assumption of how stealing develops over
time one could also construct models where the p/e ratio should be
negatively associated with the index (i.e. if stealing is likely to stop
in the future). The positive coefficient above is due to two effects:
First, managers can even steal announced profits (according to
Russian accounting some payments are made out of profits, e.g.
payments for social matters). Therefore, this money can be stolen.
Second, when pre-stealing profits pick up after the transition period
managers can steal more in relative terms (as well as in absolute
terms). This would tend to depress the p/e ratio of these firms even
under the assumption that the stealing is already reflected in the
announced profit.
39. As noted in a Troika Dialog research note on the Russian
equity market.
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40. One of the most publicised share issues had been carried out by
the Red October Chocolate Factory in 1995.
41. As a matter of fact, a presidential decree of 1 July 1996
explicitly states the following: “The capitalization of Russian
companies should be increased in the following ways:
Implementation of measures to increase the liquidity of the market,
mainly by developing a system of protections for investor rights,
including...reducing the costs and risks of the system of securities
circulation and servicing, and providing for greater information
transparency of the market”.
42. This finding is only at the first glance in some contrast to Earle
et al (1996) who find no significant differences in restructuring
behaviour by ownership. However, the measures of restructuring
analysed by Earle et al take much more time to implement than
changing the behaviour towards shareholders.
43. Furthermore, if the state was believed to hold onto its shares,
there would be less incentives to behave in a shareholder-friendly
way. This is true as the Law on the joint stock company states that
equity issues in firms where the state holds more than 25% can only
happen, if the share of the state is not diluted. This would tend to
make equity issues less profitable.
44. Only in 14% of cases is the stake of the largest outside holder
larger than 42%. The negative effect in the case of the very large
outside holdings could be due to the fact that management, together
with the largest outside blockholder, own so many shares that it is
impossible to commit not to expropriate minority interests. This
might be the case if together they own more than 75% and therefore
can change the company charter at their discretion. If there are some
arbitrarily small costs of introducing shareholder rights, these firms
are then not going to do it.
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45. As a matter of fact, the correlation is even negative. This
squares well with the argument that enterprise managers see
dividends on the state’s stake like an additional tax and are therefore
more unlikely to pay dividends.
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APPENDIX A
List of Variables
ADR Dummy whether an ADR, GDR or RDC has been issued
Comm Dummy for the communications industry
Disclosure Survey measure concerning the openness of the firm with
respect to information
Div Dummy variable whether dividends had been announced for
1994
e Employment
e^2 ‘e’ squared
Electricity Dummy for the electricity industry
Employee Combined shareholding of management and employees
IAS Dummy variable whether an international accounting firm
has been hired
Largest Amount of shares the largest outside blockholder holds
Largest^2 ‘Largest’ squared
License Dummy whether a firm uses a licensed share registry
Metal Dummy for metal industry
Oil and Gaz Dummy for oil and gaz and chemical industry
ROS Gross profits over sales for 1994
Transport Dummy for the transportation industry
Transfer Survey measure concerning the ease of transfer of
ownership
State Amount of shares the state holds
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APPENDIX B
Shareholder Rights by Industry
% of firms in the industry with
in ADR IAS Licensed ADR ADR IAS ADR Index
industry Registrar
(LR)
 & IAS & LR & LR & IAS
& LR
Communication 6.4 33.3 33.3 22.2 33.3 22.2 22.2 22.2 2.331
Electricity 9.3 23.1 15.4 38.5 15.4 23.1 15.4 15.4 1.588
Metal 29.3 2.4 9.8 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.307
Oil and Gaz 23.6 12.1 45.5 27.3 12.1 6.1 15.2 6.1 1.009
Transport 8.5 8.3 25.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 0.112
Other 22.9 6.4 21.8 15.3 2.9 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.277
Sum 100.0 10.0 24.3 17.1 7.1 5.0 7.8 4.3 0.518
APPENDIX C
Ownership by Industry
Mean
number of
Mean holding of
outside
block-
holders
outside
inves-
tors
largest
outsider
Holding
or FIG
Non-
fin.
firms
Invest-
ment
fonds
Banks Frgn
fin.
firm
State
Comm 1.6 31.8 27.7 22.1 2.2 0.8 0.6 4.5 25.0
Electricity 1.5 48.4 44.3 43.6 2.1 0.0 0.0 1.7 5.5
Metal 1.6 26.3 18.1 1.0 10.5 4.6 5.7 2.0 8.9
Oil and Gaz 1.5 31.2 27.7 20.6 1.7 1.2 4.4 2.2 16.9
Transport 1.5 19.3 12.7 0.0 6.6 4.5 2.4 3.1 25.7
Other 2.2 28.1 18.3 3.4 10.2 6.3 2.4 1.2 9.2
Sum 1.7 29.7 23.0 11.4 6.7 3.5 3.5 2.1 13
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ENDNOTES
                                                
1 While the share issue had been authorised by shareholders at
the annual shareholders meeting, the price at which the sale took
place might constitute a violation of the law on joint stock
companies. This law lays out that new issues have to be sold at or
above market prices. The Federal Securities Commission (FSC), the
regulatory body for the Russian capital markets with ministerial
rank, is at present examining this case.
2 These shares are not necessarily very liquid. Only for about 50
firms there is reliable share price information available. Shares in the
other 80 firms are highly illiquid and only very few trades occur.
3 My data does not distinguish between shares held by regional
administrations and by the federal one.
4 Even if the letter of the law is honoured, inexperienced courts
combined with ambiguous legislation might lead to the possibility of
more subtle violations of the spirit of the laws.
5 For one of the earliest manifestations of this idea An see, for
example, Grossman and Hart (1980).
6 The privatisation process in Russia allowed for 3 different
options to privatise a firm which differ by how much (and what type)
of the shares are allocated to insiders.
7 The discount has also been related to a risk that preference
shares are going to be swapped into ordinaries at unfavourable rates.
However, holder of preference shares have the right to vote on these
issues. As a swap would necessitate a change in the corporate charter
which requires a 75% majority, this risk is rather small given that
preference shares amount to 25% of charter capital. This risk is
therefore mainly relevant, if one believes that management is in
effect not bound by the corporate charter.
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8 See, for example, Levy (1982) or Zingales (1995).
9 For example, in 1994 the director of the Krasnoyarsk
Aluminium Factory cancelled out a 20% shareholding of a British
metal firm. However, this shareholding was subsequently reinstated
due to political pressure on management.
10 Since another question in the survey related more directly to
the liquidity of the share, this question is likely to pick up mainly
legal aspects and differences in transaction costs of re-registering
shares. These, in turn, can be directly controlled by management.
11 Each firm received points depending on their rank (ranging
from 30 to 10, in steps of 5) implying that the final rating would be
between 0 and 9,240. In response to this question, 222 companies
were mentioned.
12 In addition, the law on the securities market, which came into
effect in April 1996, details disclosure requirements for the case of
the issue of new securities.
13 See Financial Times, of 21.2.1997
14 To be precise the variable measures whether accounts have
been done by a Western accounting firms. While it does at times
happen, that these firms are asked to produce Russian style
accounts, this seems to be quite rare. Furthermore, even if this is the
case, it still signals that management is comparatively shareholder-
friendly, as accounts checked by a Western accounting firm with a
reputation too lose is likely to be more reliable than the one
provided by a Russian firm.
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15 See Moscow Times, September 18, 1996. As this policy has
just been announced it is unlikely to have affected the choice of
accounting rules in the sample.
16 In an interview in the Moscow Times (16.11.96 ), management
of Surgutneftegaz stated that ‘competent analysts should have
guessed that we were going to do this (the dilution) before the ADR
issue (which is planned for later this year) because later it would be
more difficult and more trouble’.
17 Level 2 ADRs are listed at an exchange, whereas level 1 ADRs
are traded over the counter. Level 2 ADRs also allow to raise new
capital for the firm only to the extent that the firm’s treasury holds
the underlying shares.
18 In this context, it is important to focus on dividends paid on
ordinary shares and not on preference shares. This is true as during
the privatisation process preference shares were only issued to
employees, not to any outsiders. Subsequent trading in these shares
was very limited as workers were obliged to keep these shares for
three years after privatisation. Therefore, dividends on preference
shares mainly reflect payments to insiders and do not indicate good
behaviour with respect to outside shareholders.
19 Formally, a dividend signalling model along the lines of Ross
(1977) or Bhattarchaya (1979) could be constructed to fit this case.
20 In this context the introduction of shareholder rights is assumed
to be irreversible as a reversal would require a 75% majority in a
general shareholder meeting.
21 In the context of the examination of shareholder rights, it
would be natural to interpret the outside finance as raised by equity
issues. However, bond issues are possible as well. To some extent
the argument above can be applied to them as well. After all, firms
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that do not steal find it presumably easier to raise finance by bonds
as well. In any case, there are at present no markets for corporate
debt, but there is a reasonably liquid one for equities. This would
facilitate equity issues as compared to debt issues. Apart from
tradable debt, there is the possibility to obtain loans. However, up to
the present time, there have not been many significant long-term
loans, presumably partly due to the inflationary environment, which
would tend to favour equity as the cheaper indexation mechanism.
22 Akamatsu (1995) reports an example of this mechanism at
work. Alfa Capital, who had bought 25% of Bolshevik Biscuit
Company in December 1992, was not permitted in the shareholder’s
meeting. Subsequently Alfa Capital applied to a court, but without
success. Finally, management allowed Alfa Capital into the meeting
after it had promised to raise money to modernise the Bolshevik
plant.
23 Another argument which would result in the same sign for ‘E’
are fixed costs to access capital markets. These fixed costs could
deter smaller firms from aiming to tap these markets, which would
reduce their incentives to implement shareholder-friendly policies.
However, the fact that the sample only includes firms that are
relatively large, makes this argument rather unconvincing.
24 In a sample of Klepach et al (1996) the firms controlled by
management are more likely to implement an ‘active survival’
strategy than employee-, state- or outsider-controlled firms. To the
extent that this strategy comprises management trying to raise new
funds, this finding supports the notion that the more management
owns, the more  likely is it that shareholder rights are introduced.
25 The very simple model above is static and can not explain why
a firm would switch from shareholder-unfriendly to shareholder-
friendly behaviour. The principal mechanism I would like to suggest
is that management buys up shares and an increase in Si would then
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lead to a switch in behaviour. However, as I have no data on
ownership over time, this will be left for subsequent research.
26 Again, this abstracts from threats to changes in private rents c.
Furthermore, liquidity considerations are disregarded in this set-up.
27 This is a similar prediction as the one made by Shleifer and
Vishny (1986) who argue that cumulating shares reduces the free
rider problem of monitoring management and therefore can make
management more likely to maximise shareholders’ wealth.
28 If shareholder-unfriendly management could prevent
shareholders from increasing their stakes, this could lead to the
opposite bias. However, in reality it seems to be the case that
management can in general not prevent share transactions among
outsiders, but instead might choose not to disclose information etc.
29 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). The authors
show that public enterprises can be encouraged by politicians
subject to pressure from interest groups, such as labour unions, to
employ too many people.
30 To some extent it can even be argued that it is a sign of
shareholder-friendly behaviour to register a firm in Moscow, as may
facilitates it for shareholders to attend the general meeting.
Therefore, it is not advisable to control for the region the firm is
registered in when running the regressions that are supposed to
explain whether shareholder rights are honoured.
31 This means, that if two investment funds have a block in a
given company, the average includes only the block held by the
larger of the two.
32 It should be noted that January 1996 was a point where foreign
involvement in the Russian equity market was at its lowest point this
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year. Therefore, one would expect much higher values for foreign
ownership in late 1996.
33 It is indeed plausible that the investment needs in the
communications industry are particularly high as demand for
communications services multiplied with the change of the economic
system in Russia It is also worth noting that the first (and to date
only) Russian firm to issue a level 3 ADR was the telecom provider
Vimplecom.
34 Including the variable into the subsequent regressions does not
improve the fit.
35 Of course, if markets would expect that the other firms were
about to honour shareholder rights this would be reflected in the
market valuation and the variables in the regression should be
insignificant.
36 Nash and Willer (1995) use a different measure for the
valuation of some firms in the oil-industry and find that the variable
‘Transfer’ did help to explain differences in valuation.
37 It could also be argued that high p/e-ratios are the reason for
honouring shareholder rights. If high p/e ratios proxied for high
investment needs, this could be possible. While this would make it
impossible to talk about causation in the above regression, it would
be entirely consistent with the above model.
38 Depending on the assumption of how stealing develops over
time one could also construct models, where the p/e ratio should be
negatively associated with the index (i.e. if stealing is likely to stop
in the future). The positive coefficient above is due to two effects:
First, managers can even steal announced profits (according to
Russian accounting some payments are made out of profits, e.g.
payments for social matters). Therefore, this money can be stolen.
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Second, when pre-stealing profits pick up after the transition period
managers can steal more in relative terms (as well as in absolute
terms). This would tend to depress the p/e ratio of these firms even
under the assumption that the stealing is already reflected in the
announced profit.
39 As noted in a Troika Dialog research note on the Russian
equity market.
40 One of the most publicised share issues had been carried out by
the Red October Chocolate Factory in 1995.
41 As a matter of fact, a presidential decree of July, 1, 1996
explicitly states the following: “The capitalization of Russian
companies should be increased in the following ways:
Implementation of measures to increase the liquidity of the market,
mainly by developing a system of protections for investor rights,
including ...  reducing the costs and risks of the system of securities
circulation and servicing, and providing for greater information
transparency of the market”.
42 This finding is only at the first glance in some contrast to Earle
et al (1996), who find no significant differences in restructuring
behaviour by ownership. However, the measures of restructuring
Earle et al analyse take much more time to implement than changing
the behaviour towards shareholders.
43 Furthermore, if the state was believed to hold on to its shares,
there would be less incentives to behave in a shareholder-friendly
way. This is true as the Law on the joint stock company states that
equity issues in firms where the state holds more than 25% can only
happen, if the share of the state is not diluted. This would tend to
make equity issues less profitable.
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44 Only in 14% of cases is the stake of the largest outside holder
larger than 42%. The negative effect in the case of the very large
outside holdings could be due to the fact that management together
with the largest outside blockholder own so many shares, that it is
impossible to commit not to expropriate minority interests. This
might be the case if together they own more than 75% and therefore
can change the company charter at their discretion. If there are some
arbitrarily small costs of introducing shareholder rights, these firms
are then not going to do it.
45 As a matter of fact, the correlation is even negative. This
squares well with the argument that enterprise managers see
dividends on the state’s stake like an additional tax and are therefore
more unlikely to pay dividends.
